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HANDLING COMMODITY FUTURES
TRANSACTIONS
— by Neil E. Harl*
In the same manner as other merchants and
manufacturers, farm and ranch taxpayers buy and sell
commodity futures to hedge against fluctuating prices.1
Likewise, farm and ranch taxpayers buy and sell commodity
futures as speculators.  The principal matter of concern from
an income tax perspective in the farm and ranch area is the
line between hedging and speculation.
Hedging transactions.  Hedging is defined in terms
of reducing the risk of price (or interest rate) fluctuations in
the ordinary course of the taxpayer's business.2  Hedging
gains and losses generate ordinary income and loss and are
not subject to the loss deferral rules and the "marked-to-
market" provisions that are applicable to speculative
transactions.3  Gains and losses that do not qualify as hedges
and do not involve contracts primarily for sale to customers
in the ordinary course of business are treated as capital gains
and losses.4
The courts have emphasized two tests in evaluating
commodity futures transactions as hedges or as speculative
ventures — (1) the insurance test and (2) the direct relation
test.
Insurance test.   If a taxpayer uses futures trading to
offset price changes in actual commodities (the "actuals"),
the insurance test is met.5  Even if the taxpayer was not
using futures trading to offset price movements in actuals,
the U.S. Supreme Court has held that futures trading is
hedging and not speculation if the commodity transactions
are an integral part of the taxpayer's business.6  In Corn
Products Refining Co. v. United States,7 the taxpayer
purchased corn futures during harvest when prices were
lower as a "pre-hedge" effort to guard against price increases.
The court held that the transactions were not speculative
dealings but were an integral part of its business and were
designed to assure a ready supply of corn for manufacturing
purposes while protecting itself against price increases.  The
court denied long-term capital gain treatment for profits
from futures transactions (which is the proper treatment for
speculative gains) and held that the gains were ordinary
income.
The  U.S. Supreme  Court  in  Arkansas  Best  Corp. v.
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Commissioner 8 limited Corn Products Refining Co.9 to its
facts in allowing ordinary income from sales of commodity
futures —
"Corn Products is properly interpreted as standing for the
narrow proposition that hedging transactions that are an
integral part of a business' inventory-purchase system fall
within the inventory exclusion of § 1221."10
Recently, the courts have been asked to apply Corn
Products Refining Co.11 to post-harvest sales of crops and
the purchase of like amounts of commodities in the futures
market under the theory that the post-harvest position in the
futures market was an integral part of the farming
operation.12  In Nicholas C. Patterson,13 the taxpayer, an
Arkansas farmer, sold soybeans at harvest because of
inadequate storage and bought soybean futures; the
transactions were held to be speculative and not hedges on
the grounds the taxpayer was not insuring against the risk of
loss as to actual commodities.  The argument that the Corn
Products Refining Co.14 doctrine should apply was
rejected.15  If the futures transaction is entered into after the
actual commodity has been disposed of, there is no
remaining risk of price change in the actual commodities,
the insurance test is not met and gains and losses are capital
gains and losses.16
Apparently, the Internal Revenue Service has taken the
position that "fence" positions involving the purchase of
puts and the sale of calls are not a hedge.17  Such
arrangements involve establishing a minimum and
maximum price for the commodity.
"Direct relation" test.   Under the direct relation
test, there must be a direct relation between the taxpayer's
business and the commodity market transaction if the
transaction is to be considered a hedge.18  Thus, the mere
fact of purchase and sale of futures by a farmer producing
the commodity involved does not assure that commodity
futures transactions will be treated as hedges.19  Likewise,
where the pattern of futures trading by a cattle feeder was
three to five times the number of cattle on hand, the direct
relation test was not met.20  The amount of the position
held and the pattern of trades must bear a reasonable
relationship to the actuals held by the taxpayer.21  Thus,
where the amount of futures trading exceeds substantially
that needed to provide price protection for actual
commodities or the pattern of purchases and sales in futures
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is not consistent with securing price protection for the
actuals, the transactions are likely to be treated as
speculative rather than hedges with the result that gains and
losses are capital gains and losses.22
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CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
ADVERSE POSSESSION
REPUDIATION.  Two brothers, William and Walter,
received an undivided interest in farm land from their father.
The brothers partitioned the land into equal sized tracts.
William's land had a fence running through it, dividing off
22.5 acres.  Walter and his children used the 22.5 acres for
various farming activities for more than 10 years.  The
lower appellate court held that although as between separate
owners of the two tracts, the 22.5 acres would have
belonged to Walter under adverse possession, because the
22.5 acres were transferred to William in the partition,
Walter would be required to repudiate the transfer of the 22.5
acres before claiming title to the land by adverse possession.
The Texas Supreme Court reversed, holding that because
Walter did not possess the disputed land before the
partitioning, repudiation was not required before adverse
possession could commence.  Beard v. McLaren, 8 1 1
S.W.2d 564 (Tex. 1991), rev'g , 798 S.W.2d 5 9 7
(Tex. Ct. App. 1990).
AGRICULTURAL LABOR
